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Abstract
Company tax integration in the EU is yet to be realised. This
article first outlines the main benefits of company tax inte-
gration for the Economic and Monetary Union, and also dis-
cusses the main legal obstacles the EU Treaties pose for har-
monisation of company tax. The main problem identified is
the unanimity requirement in the legal basis of Article 115
TFEU. As this requirement is currently not feasible in the
political climate of the debt crisis, this article assesses possi-
ble reasons for and ways to further fiscal integration. It con-
siders Treaty change, enhanced cooperation, soft law
approaches and also indirect harmonisation through the
new system of economic governance. Eventually, a possible
non-EU option is considered. However, this article recom-
mends making use of the current EU law framework, such
as soft law approaches and the system of the new economic
governance to achieve a more subtle and less intrusive tax
harmonisation, or instead a Treaty change that would legiti-
mately enhance and further economic integration in the
field of taxation.
Keywords: company tax harmonisation, EU law, Internal
Market, taxation policies
1 Introduction
Company tax integration in the European Union (EU)
has long been on the agenda. However, several legal and
political obstacles have so far prevented any substantial
EU legislation in the field. However, a new movement
to achieve company tax harmonisation has recently been
realised in the Commission Proposal for a Directive on a
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Basis (CCCTB
Directive). This might be a step in the right direction,
but much still needs to be done. The financial and sov-
ereign debt crisis has already exposed that more eco-
nomic integration is necessary in the economic and
monetary union. With the crisis straining Member
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States’ budgets, it becomes increasingly important for
them to keep their tax revenue high, which is why a
heated public debate on tax avoidance has put tax inte-
gration back on the European Council agenda.
While the crisis might further impede tax integration in
the EU, it might also bring opportunities to tackle the
legal and political obstacles that have so far hindered
integration. The aim of this article is two-fold. First, the
main benefits, and also legal obstacles, for company tax
integration will be put in the context of Economic and
Monetary Union. Second, the article aims to assess the
possible solutions to these obstacles from a European
public law perspective. This article is divided into four
substantive sections. An outline of the benefits of tax
integration in today’s Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) precedes the mapping of legal obstacles for tax
integration, taking the CCCTB Directive1 as an exam-
ple, where appropriate. It follows an assessment of pos-
sible solutions in the context of the EMU. The last
section provides some concluding remarks and general
concerns regarding the solutions considered.
2 The Crisis-Stricken EMU and
the Benefits of Tax
Integration
2.1 Reforms to the Economic and Monetary
Union
The financial and sovereign debt crisis has left the EU
in turmoil and in need of further reform. The major
problem the crises have shown is the division of compe-
tences between the EU and its Member States.2 While
the EU has exclusive competence with matters regard-
ing the monetary union,3 economic policies have been
1. The CCCTB directive is discussed in detail elsewhere in this journal issue.
2. For a discussion of the history of EMU in the EU, please see: J. Morten-
sen, ‘Economic Policy Coordination in the Economic and Monetary
Union: From Maastricht via the SGP to the Fiscal Pact’, CEPS Working
Document No. 381, August 2013. Working Paper, August 2013,
<http://www.ceps.be/book/economic-policy-coordination-economic-
and -monetary -union -maastricht -sgp -fiscal -pact> (last visited
10 November 2013).
3. Art. 3(c) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter:
‘TFEU’).
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left to the Member States themselves subject to coordi-
nation within the framework of the Union.4
The Member States of the eurozone have resorted to an
array of measures to tackle the crisis, including the
famous six-pack5 and two-pack6 sets of legislation aim-
ing to increase oversight of economic policies in the
EMU. These eight pieces of secondary law provisions
aim to enhance both the multilateral surveillance proce-
dure and the persuasive arm (the Excessive Deficit Pro-
cedure, EDP) of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP);
in addition, a macroeconomic imbalances procedure
modelled on the basis of the multilateral surveillance
procedure is introduced. Next to these EU law meas-
ures, the Fiscal Compact is designed to back up the new
reversed qualified voting procedure in the Council
regarding a decision on the existence of an excessive
deficit. This means that a measure will be deemed adopt-
ed unless a qualified majority rejects it in the Council.7
Deviation from any of the ‘Maastricht criteria’8 will now
trigger an EDP, in contrast to the pre-reform legislation
under which these criteria were cumulative.9
In addition, stringent procedures for the correction of
macroeconomic imbalances are put in place, similar to
the EDP. Correction of macroeconomic imbalances now
4. Arts. 2(3) and 5(1) TFEU.
5. Consisting of:
– Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of
budgetary surveillance in the euro area, Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Union [2011] OJ L306/1.
– Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to cor-
rect excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011]
OJ L306/8.
– Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation
(EC) No. 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budg-
etary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic
policies [2011] OJ L306/12.
– Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction
of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L306/25.
– Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011
amending Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 on speeding up and clarify-
ing the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [2011] OJ
L306/33.
– Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on require-
ments for budgetary frameworks of the Member States [2011] OJ
L306/41.
6. Consisting of two legislative proposals:
– COM(2011)0819 final, Proposal for a regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of economic
and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial sta-
bility in the euro area.
– COM(2011)0821 final, Proposal for a regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on common provisions for monitoring
and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of
excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area.
7. Ibid.; Art. 5(2) Regulation 1173/2011.
8. A Member State is allowed to have a total amount of debt of 60% of
the GDP and an annual debt ratio of 3% of the GDP. These criteria
were laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact in Maastricht.
9. For a discussion of the pre-crisis system of economic governance see for
example: J. Breuss, ‘The Stability and Growth Pact. Experiences and
Future Aspects’, in Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für
Europa (2007).
takes place in accordance with the Commission, which
has to approve Member States’ budgetary plans if they
fall under the EDP. In addition, the requirements for
reports and the transmission of Medium Term Objec-
tives and stability programmes have been increased.
The national legislator is now required to provide proof
of liabilities, expected economic developments as well as
economic variables.10 Most eurozone Member States,
furthermore, have signed and ratified the Treaty Estab-
lishing a European Stability Mechanism (ESM)11 as
well as the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Gov-
ernance, the so-called Fiscal Compact (TSCG), men-
tioned above.12
As these reforms indicate, European leaders do strive to
strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union; howev-
er, it seems that there is less consensus as to the further
measures to be taken to enhance economic cohesion and
to strengthen the internal market. In the following, the
role of company tax integration in the EU is discussed
in the context of the EMU.
2.2 The Benefits of Company Tax Integration
for the EMU
It could be argued that company tax integration can be
beneficial for the Economic and Monetary Union for
three main reasons, namely increased economic cohe-
sion in the Internal Market, improved fiscal oversight
and better control of tax fraud and evasion.
Economic and Monetary Union is seen as the last step
of economic integration, which has at the outset the aim
of improving overall prosperity in a region. For this
final step, economic cohesion is desirable for the good
functioning of a monetary union, in order for Member
States to outweigh the costs with benefits of giving up
its own exchange rate.13 Traditionally, an optimum cur-
rency area (OCA)14 is seen as a basis for a working cur-
rency union. Economies are perceived to form an OCA
if they are symmetric in certain ways. First, business
cycles should run similarly in order for a single mone-
tary policy to be beneficial for all the participating
economies, which also prevents asymmetric shocks in
the currency union. Second, inflation rates should be
similar in order to enhance competition in the union,
while production within a participating economy should
10. Art. 1(6) Regulation 1175/2011.
11. Treaty establishing a European Stability Mechanism (hereinafter, ESM
Treaty).
12. For a discussion of the Fiscal Compact see for example: A. Kocharov,
‘Another Legal Monster? An EUI Debate on the Fiscal Compact Treaty’,
SSRN Scholarly Paper, Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network,
1. April 2012, <http://cadmus.eui .eu/bitstream/handle/1814/21496/
LAW_2012_09_Kocharov_ed.pdf> (last visited 10 November 2013).
13. R.A. Mundell, ‘A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas’, 51 The Ameri-
can Economic Review 4 (1961); J. Bogusław Osoba, ‘Theory of Opti-
mum Currency Areas and Monetary Integration in the European Union’,
10 Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe 6, pp. 27-44 at
29ff. (2012).
14. Optimum Currency Area describes an area of high economic cohesion
that should form the basis of a monetary union. It reduces the risk of
anti-cyclical action that is not beneficial for one or more parts of the
monetary union. Economic cohesion here includes sectoral similarities,
convergent economic cycles etc. See for further explanation above
n. 13.
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be diverse in order to avoid a situation where one sector-
al problem influences the whole economy (e.g. unem-
ployment) or another economy in the currency union.
In addition, a currency union should be able to absorb
financial and economic (external) shocks by providing
wage price flexibility, integration of financial markets,
and also mobility of productive factors and fiscal inte-
gration.15
The Internal Market in the EU could be said to have
achieved some degree of wage price flexibility owing to
increased intra-sectoral competition in the EU, although
the direct effects of the Internal Market on the labour
market have also been disputed.16 In particular, the pro-
visions on the Internal Market aim to facilitate the
mobility of productive factors by enabling free move-
ment of goods, persons, services and capital.17 In addi-
tion, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Member
States have made efforts to further integrate the finan-
cial markets in the EU; most recently, a European Bank-
ing Union has been put on its way.18
This leaves one element of OCA to be discussed: fiscal
integration. While complete fiscal integration in the EU,
such as a single budget, is explicitly excluded in the
Treaties,19 such a harmonisation of tax law that directly
affects the functioning of the Internal Market is allowed
and desired under the Treaties.20
The system of company tax is of direct influence on the
Internal Market, as it influences the manner in which,
and where, companies establish themselves in the EU.
Company tax integration could contribute to enhancing
economic convergence by increasing competition in the
Internal Market, as companies could establish them-
selves and move much more freely between Member
States than they currently do. Different taxation in dif-
ferent regions (read Member States) within one market
might drive investors to another region even though
they would like to establish themselves in the first
region,21 which is why tax obstacles distort the working
of the Internal Market.
15. See further on this: Osoba, above n. 13, at 30ff.
16. H. Siebert ‘Labor Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in
Europe’, 11 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, at 37-54 (1 July
1997).
17. C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (2007).
18. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of The Coun-
cil establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution
of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a
Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and
amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament
and of the Council /*COM/2013/0520 final – 2013/0253, available at:
http:// eur -lex .europa .eu/ LexUriServ/ LexUriServ .do ?uri= CELEX:
52013PC0520:EN:NOT.
19. Arts. 3(1) (c), 5 Treaty on the functioning of the European Union
(TFEU); M. Larch, ‘101 Proposals to reform the Stability and Growth
Pact. Why So Many? A Survey’, Economic Paper Series of the Directo-
rate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, available at: <http://ec
.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication833_en.pdf> (last
visited November 10, 2013) at 5.
20. See below n. 41
21. S. Desai, ‘Taxation without Harmonization in the European Union’
(2003), available at: <http://aei.pitt.edu/2857/1/106.pdf> (last visited
10 November 2013), at 4.
Current tax obstacles include limited cross-border
relief, obtrusive calculation of transfer prices, double
taxation and unequal treatment of parent and subsidiary
companies.22 Cross-border relief of tax refers to a situa-
tion in which profits and losses of a company fall under
different jurisdictions, while the respective company is
then able to deduct the loss incurred in one country
from its taxable profit in another.23 This kind of relief is
possible only to a limited extent in the EU, by means of
a credit system.24 Transfer pricing describes the process
by which a company tries to internally shift its net prof-
its to lower company tax countries in order to increase
its profits.25 For this process, rules are in place, but they
differ from country to country.26 More traditionally,
problems of double taxation – profit is taxed in more
than one jurisdiction – and unequal treatment arise. By
eliminating these tax obstacles, companies would have a
much better position in the market – it would attract
more companies to establish themselves in the EU.
In fact, the original ‘Pact for Competitiveness’, integrat-
ed in the Euro-Plus Pact, has already argued for a com-
mon assessment basis for the corporate income tax.27
Also, this document stresses the effect of company tax
integration as promoting the accessibility and attractive-
ness of the Internal Market.
Secondly, company tax integration could also help to
contribute to fulfilling another important role in the
EMU, that of fiscal oversight.28
In the Economic and Monetary Union in the EU, com-
petence on monetary policy is given to a European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB), while fiscal policy remains in Member
States’ scopes of competence.29 Without a strict Euro-
pean fiscal surveillance operation system in place, the
Stability and Growth Pact30 was intended to counter
Member States who would not conform with set con-
vergence criteria (3% of GDP as new annual debt; 60%
22. ECO/302 CCCTB, Opinion of the European Economic and Social Com-
mittee on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB),
Brussels, 26 October 2011.
23. Europa.eu Website ‘Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situa-
tions’, <http:// europa .eu/ legislation_ summaries/ taxation/ l31059_ en
.htm> (last visited 18 November 2013).
24. Ibid.
25. Ramy Elitzur and Jack Mintz, ‘Transfer Pricing Rules and Corporate Tax
Competition’, 60 Journal of Public Economics 3, at 401-422 (June
1996). doi:10.1016/0047-2727(95)01558-2, p. 402ff.
26. Ibid.
27. The Pact for Competitiveness, unofficial translation 3 February 2011,
available at: <http:// www .euractiv .com/ sites/ all/ euractiv/ files/
BRNEDA224_004512.pdf> (last visited 10 November 2013).
28. Conclusions of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area of
11 March 2011, Annex 1, available at: <http://www.consilium.europa
.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119809.pdf> (last visited
10 November 2013) at 11.
29. Arts. 3(1) (c), 5 Treaty on the functioning of the European Union
(TFEU); M. Larch et al. (2013), above n. 19.
30. The term Stability and Growth Pact refers to a set of primary and sec-
ondary legislation adopted in an attempt to safeguard convergence
between Member States in the EMU. The original pact consisted of Art.
121 and 126 TFEU, Regulations 1466/97 and 1467/97 EC, Protocol
No. 12 annexed to the treaties and a European Council resolution of
17 June 1997.
41
Anna Sting ELR May 2014 | No. 1
of GDP as total amount of debt) once a Member of the
Eurozone.31
However, as the debt crisis has shown, control of Mem-
ber States’ budgets and expenditure was lacking under
the old SGP, which has been identified as one of the
reasons leading to the debt crisis.32 In fact, two main
problems can be identified here. First, while the SGP
was and is built around two reference values, the SGP
ignores other factors that might influence the fiscal sit-
uation of a state. The 3% and 60% margins are only of
nominal value and compliance does not reveal how gov-
ernment money is spent or invested.33 Second, Member
States were to provide their own fiscal information to
the European Commission; this information was not
always double-checked.34
The recent reforms to the system have improved the
information policy in this respect; however, company
tax integration in the EU could offer another way of
monitoring fiscal policy of Member States. In an inte-
grated company tax system, oversight on Member
States’ tax revenue and expenditure could become eas-
ier. It can help to increase fiscal transparency and would
help a centralised authority (such as the Commission) to
keep track of a Member State’s income, next to the
information that is already provided by Member States
in the form of stability and convergence programmes.
This control is important for safeguarding the stability
of the eurozone by (partly) eliminating creative account-
ing35 and by providing another useful tool in detecting
macroeconomic imbalances before they lead to prob-
lems.
Thirdly, company tax integration for the EU would
reduce the likelihood of tax fraud and evasion within the
Internal Market, as it creates a European level playing
field for companies. Especially in times of economic cri-
sis and diminished tax revenues, this becomes a problem
for Member States. While tax evasion is already on the
political agenda for non-EU tax havens,36 company tax
integration could represent a big step forward in the
internal context of the EU.
The heads of state or government of the euro area have
summarised these advantages of a corporate tax integra-
tion in the Euro-Plus Pact of 2011, when they state that
31. <http:// ec .europa .eu/ economy_ finance/ publications/ publication833_
en.pdf> (last visited 10 November 2013) at 6.
32. M. Larch, P. Van den Noord and L. Jonung, ‘The Stability and Growth
Pact: Lessons from the Great Recession’ (2010), available at: <http://
mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27900/>, (last visited 10 November 2013)
at 16.
33. A. Lemmer, ‘Revenue Windfalls and Expenditure Slippages: Disappoint-
ing Implementation of the Reformed Stability and Growth Pact’, 44
Intereconomics 3, 159, at 165 (2009).
34. Regulation 3605/93 EC.
35. Term often used with respect to the Greek creative accounting before
entering the eurozone, see for example A. Cabral, ‘Main Aspects of the
Working of the SGP’, in J. Breuss (ed.), The Stability and Growth Pact.
Experiences and Future Aspects, Schriftenreihe Der Österreichischen
Gesellschaft Für Europa (2007), at 141.
36. See for example: ‘Combating Tax Fraud and Evasion’, Commission con-
tribution to the European Council of 22 May 2013, available at:
<http:// ec .europa .eu/ europe2020/ pdf/ tax_ en .pdf> (last visited
10 November 2013).
‘developing a common corporate tax base could be a
revenue neutral way forward to ensure consistency
among national tax systems while respecting national tax
strategies, and to contribute to fiscal sustainability and
the competitiveness of European businesses’.37
3 Obstacles for Company Tax
Integration in Times of Crisis
There are two categories of legal obstacles to company
tax integration in the EU, when approached from a
European public law perspective: first, the lack of a spe-
cific legal base of tax integration in the Treaties, and
second the subsidiarity principle. The main problem
evolving from both is the unanimity requirement in the
Council for any taxation matters.
3.1 Lack of (Specific) Legal Base
With regard to taxation of companies, the Treaties do
not directly transfer taxing powers.38 No direct transfer
of powers, however, does not mean that there is no com-
petence at all for the EU.39 The Treaty does confer on
the EU a means of more general legislative power under
Article 114 TFEU and 115 TFEU, allowing it to legis-
late when and where needed for the functioning of the
Internal Market. However, Article 114(2) TFEU for-
bids the Union to adopt any fiscal provisions under the
ordinary legislative procedure this article provides for.
Therefore, any harmonisation attempt has to be based
on the legal base in Article 115 TFEU, which reads:
Without prejudice to Article 114, the Council shall,
acting unanimously in accordance with a special legis-
lative procedure and after consulting the European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee,
issue directives for the approximation of such laws,
regulations or administrative provisions of the Mem-
ber States as directly affect the establishment or func-
tioning of the internal market.40
Using this article as legal basis is paid by the price of
cumulative restrictions on adopting legislation. The
legal base for approximation of laws only allows the
Council to adopt such measures as to approximate (not
harmonise) laws, by means of directives. This means
37. Conclusions of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area of
11 March 2011, at 11. Also see: Z. Danko, ‘Corporate Tax Harmonisa-
tion in the European Union’, in Crisis Aftermath: Economic Policy
Changes in the EU and its Member States, Conference Proceedings,
Szeged, University of Szeged (2012), 207-218, at 215.
38. W. Hellerstein, G. Kofler and R. Mason, ‘Constitutional Restraints on
Corporate Tax Integration’, Tax Law Review, forthcoming. Available at
SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101560> (last visited 10 November
2013) at 63.
39. F. Amtenbrink and H. Raulus, ‘Contribution to: Fiscal Policy in the Euro-
pean Union Context – The Semi-Fetached Sovereignty of Member
States in the European Union’, in S. Jansen (ed.), Fiscal Sovereignty of
the Member States in an Internal Market-Past and Future, Eucotax Ser-
ies (2010) 1, at 6.
40. Emphasis added by the author.
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that, by definition, a regulation, which would be binding
in its entirety,41 cannot be adopted under Article 115
TFEU. While approximation of corporate tax can easily
be justified to directly affect the functioning of the
internal market,42 legislation still has to be adopted
unanimously.
Unanimity in the Council, however, is a difficult target
to achieve in the EU-28. It is, on the one hand, only
sensible, from a constitutional point of view, to safe-
guard the general legal base of Article 115 TFEU with a
stringent legislative procedure so as to avoid any compe-
tence creep43 by the EU. On the other hand, it is also
obvious that this special legislative procedure stands in
stark contrast to the ordinary legislative procedure,44
which only requires a qualified majority (QMV), albeit
with consent from the European Parliament. Taxation
systems differ considerably between the Member States,
and they are unlikely to agree on anything in this field.
The use of the special legislative procedure in Article
115 illustrates this Member State reluctance to share
more powers than transferred already with the EU.
With regard to fiscal integration, this becomes very
explicit in Article 114(2) TFEU, which excludes the use
of Article 114(1) TFEU as a legal basis for fiscal provi-
sions (thereby leaving Article 115 TFEU as the only
legal base). Also, other Treaty provisions (or rather the
lack thereof) emphasise the fiscal autonomy of Member
States. While the Union is equipped with exclusive
competence for providing monetary policy,45 Member
States shall coordinate their economic policies within
the Union.46 This does entail a positive obligation in the
word ‘shall’, but still leaves a lot of room for manoeuvre
for Member States to organise their tax policy beyond
the economic coordination efforts laid down in the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact, even after the recent reforms.
Taxation, in particular company tax integration, still
remains in the Member States’ sphere of competence,
despite obvious advantages.
Indeed, Member States also have a (protectionist?)
interest in keeping this autonomy for themselves. Some
countries, for example the Netherlands, have been able
to attract important multinationals to establish them-
selves in their countries, with consequent gains in tax
revenue.47 In fact, countries compete for these kinds of
capital flows, as eventually countries finance their public
spending by the levying of taxes.48 In times of economic
crisis, this is another sensitive issue where Member
States find it hard to agree: how, if taxation were to be
harmonised, should the tax revenue be allocated
between them? Fundamental disagreement is predes-
41. Art. 288 TFEU.
42. Desai, above n. 21.
43. See for example: A. Prechal, ‘Competence Creep and General Principles
of Law’, 3 Review of European 1 Administrative Law 5, at 5 (2010).
44. Art. 294 TFEU.
45. Art. 3(1)(c) TFEU.
46. Art. 5 TFEU.
47. A. de Graaf, ‘International Tax Policy Needed to Counterbalance the
“Excessive” Behaviour of Multinationals’, 22 EC Tax Review 2, at
106-110 (2013).
48. Ibid.
tined with regard to corporate taxation. Additionally,
the current political climate in the economic crisis does
make it even more difficult for the Member States to
reach agreement. Pressure from the international com-
munity, their electorates and parliaments puts national
governments in a position without an elegant solution.
Reforms have to be done, but they do not want to be the
ones making the unpopular changes. Maybe unjustifia-
bly, other topics are on the agenda of national govern-
ments besides company tax integration in a fight for the
electorates, who on the other hand are more and more
driven to populist Eurosceptic parties such as in the
Netherlands and Finland.49 Euroscepticism is also on
the rise in other Member States, in particular in Great
Britain, which also opposed the revision of the Treaties
in the first round of EMU reform efforts, leading to the
conclusion of the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Compact.50
3.2 The Subsidiarity Protocol and Company Tax
Integration: The Example of the CCCTB
The unanimity requirement is not the only obstacle that
stands in the way of tax integration. The EU has com-
mitted itself to the principle of subsidiarity,51 which is a
governance principle in institutional theory, regulating
the allocation and the use of public power.52 Subsidiari-
ty aims to avoid undesired centralisation in a suprana-
tional entity.53 Next to the principles of conferral and
proportionality, the principle of subsidiarity is also one
of the fundamental principles of European governance,
as enshrined in Article 5 of the Treaty on EU (TEU).
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas that do not
fall under the exclusive competence of the Union, the
Union shall only act if and only to the extent that ‘the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
be achieved by the Member States, [...] but [...] can bet-
ter be achieved at Union level’.54
The principle imposes three cumulative requirements
for Union action: (i) there must be an objective, (ii) the
objective to be achieved cannot sufficiently be dealt with
by Member States and (iii) the Union must be better
equipped to achieve the objective. Subsidiarity is appli-
cable only to legislative fields in which the EU has a
shared competence. In exclusive competence areas, sub-
sidiarity, by definition, does not play a role. The estab-
lishment and functioning of the Internal Market is a
shared competence between Member States and the
EU.
49. G. Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands and the True
Finns (Perussuomalaiset) in Finland.
50. ‘EU Suffers Worst Split in History as David Cameron Blocks Treaty
Change’, in The Telegraph, 9 December 2011, available at: <http://
www .telegraph .co .uk/ news/ worldnews/ europe/ eu/ 8945155/ EU -
suffers-worst-split-in-history-as-David-Cameron-blocks-treaty-change
.html> (last visited 10 November 2013).
51. Art. 5 Treaty on European Union (hereinafter: TEU).
52. A. Follesdal, ‘Subsidiarity and Democratic Deliberation’, in E. Eriksen et
al. (eds.), Democracy in the European Union: Integration through
Deliberation? (2000), at 85-110, electronic copy available at: <http://
ssrn .com/ abstract= 1750981> (last visited 10 November 2013), page
numbers of citations refer to this document, at 2.
53. Ibid.
54. Art. 5(3) TEU.
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As a result of this, any attempts to harmonise corporate
taxes under Article 115 TFEU are subject to the princi-
ple of subsidiarity and its corresponding protocol No. 2
on the application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and
Proportionality. This protocol grants national parlia-
ments the right to scrutinise the legislative proposals
emanating from the Commission. According to Protocol
No. 2, the Commission is required to forward all draft
legislative acts (Regulations, Directives and Decisions55)
to national parliaments at the same time as it forwards
them to the Union legislator,56 while the Council and
the European Parliament have to keep national parlia-
ments informed of their amendments to the proposals.57
As of the moment of the transmission of the draft legis-
lative act, national parliaments are granted 8 weeks to
assess whether the act complies with the principle of
subsidiarity and communicate a reasoned opinion
to the European Parliament, the Council and the Com-
mission.58 Such a reasoned opinion contains an assess-
ment of the parliamentary chamber why a proposed leg-
islative act is not in conformity with the subsidiarity and
is directly forwarded to the Commission.59 If a third of
the parliamentary chambers issue a reasoned opinion
pleading for breach of the subsidiarity principle,60 the
draft legislation then must be reviewed; on giving rea-
sons, the Commission may maintain, amend or with-
draw the proposal.61
Parliaments are, generally speaking, not very active in
scrutinising legislative proposals under this procedure,
even where their own parliamentary prerogatives (fe.
the increased budgetary control by the Commission
55. Art. 288 TFEU.
56. Art. 4(1) Protocol No. 2.
57. Art 4(2-4) Protocol No. 2.
58. Art. 6 Protocol No. 2.
59. See for examples: Saeima (Latvian Parliament) Saeima identifies viola-
tion of subsidiarity principle in the EU’s proposal for regulation, parlia-
mentary press release of 23 May 2012, available at: <http://saeima.lv/
en/ news/ saeima -news/ 19732 -saeima -identifies -violation -of -
subsidiarity -principle -in -the -eu -s -proposal -for -regulation>; Reasoned
opinions issued by the House of Commons as listed and linked at:
<http:// www .parliament .uk/ business/ committees/ committees -a -z/
commons -select/ european -scrutiny -committee/ scrutiny -reserve -
overrides/>; German Bundestag Printed Paper 17/8000 of 30 Novem-
ber 2011, Committee recommendation and report of the Committee
on Legal Affairs (6th committee) on the communication Printed Paper
17/7713 no. a.5-Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and the Council on a Common European Sales Law (unofficial transla-
tion communicated to IPEX), available at: www .ipex .eu/ IPEXL -WEB/
dossier/ files/ download/ 082dbcc5358a6ec60135a4f0e762114a .do
+reasoned+opinion+eu+subsidiarity+bundestag&hl=de&pid=bl&srcid=
ADGEESirKHrVbjDeU3iHt6W4eefi7HczClkYJoRD29rVHw3ADppzLkAX
3SnEKYkY8bKQM78l_
XA7bRrPkTPNYIVn4nxWronlJybmkqjAnbDjwA7Qhap5RbPN7uO02N0j
9IDxxS2TmWXr& sig= AHIEtbTyrUUyjiY -NTUzdDz_ gfRZIHWOmQ>
(electronic sources last visited 10 November 2013).
60. Art. 7(2) Protocol No. 2. In case of legislation in the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice only a quarter of parliamentary chambers are need-
ed.
61. Ibid.
introduced by the six-pack and two-pack) are con-
cerned.62
However, with regard to the Commission proposal for a
common consolidated corporate tax basis (CCCTB
Directive), parliaments have been much more active,
which illustrates their strong opposition to more tax
harmonisation. Only by one parliamentary reasoned
opinion, the threshold of one-third of parliaments was
missed, as nine parliamentary chambers, including the
Dutch Tweede Kamer, issued a reasoned opinion63 to the
Commission. This CCCTB led to one of the highest
numbers of reasoned opinions ever issued under the
protocol.64 The canon of these reasoned opinions65
stresses four points of parliamentary concern. They
state that the Commission has failed to produce a
detailed statement based on relevant criteria for assess-
ment of the merits of EU, as opposed to national, action.
They doubt that an additional tax base system to the
already existing 28 systems does in fact simplify matters
for companies.66 In addition, they argue that the pros-
perity value of the CCCTB would likely be either limit-
ed or even negative, which is related to feared budgetary
erosion and decrease in taxation revenues. Lastly, par-
liaments posit that the proposal encroaches upon Mem-
ber State sovereignty in the area of taxation,67 as compa-
nies would be able to choose which system they want to
apply to them, the CCCTB or the national system. The
main question raised by parliaments seems to boil down
to: ‘What is the use of it?’
Given this response to the CCCTB, it is unlikely that
parliaments would support any further tax integration,
if proposed by the Commission. The Commission is
very much aware of this Member State government and
62. A. Sting, ‘Lack of Forum, Lack of Power: Involvement of National Par-
liaments in Economic Decision-Making in the EU’, York, United King-
dom, presentation at SLSA Conference-Stream: Europe, Crisis? What
Crisis?, 27 March 2013.
63. Kamerstuk 32728-3, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Gemotiveerd
advies over het voorstel voor een Richtlijn van de Raad betreffende een
gemeenschappelijke, geconsolideerde heffingsgrondslag voor de ven-
nootschapsbelasting (CCCTB)-COM (2011) 121.
64. Report from the Commission on Subsidiarity and Proportionality (19th
report on Better Lawmaking covering the year 2011), COM(2012) 373
final, Brussels, 10.7.2012, available at: <http:// ec .europa .eu/
governance/ better_ regulation/ documents/ com_ 2012_ 0373_ en .pdf>
(last visited 10 November 2013), at 4.
65. Nine reasoned opinions from the Dutch Tweede Kamer, the Romanian
Chamber of Deputies, the Swedish, Slovakian, Bulgarian and Maltese
Parliaments, the UK House of Commons, the Irish Dáil Éireann and the
Polish Lower House as well as five contributions from the Portuguese,
Danish and Luxembourg Parliaments and the Italian and Belgian Cham-
bers of Deputies, see: European Parliament, State of Play on reasoned
opinions and contributions submitted by national Parliaments under
Protocol No. 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, Brussels, 30 May 2011, available
at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/webdav/site/myjahiasite/
shared/ subsidiarity/ State%20of%20play%20notes/ 2011/ State%20of
%20play%2030%20May%20%202011 .pdf> (last visited 10 Novem-
ber 2013).
66. See for example the Czech contribution: The Senate of the Parliament
of the Czech Republic, 8th term, 241th resolution of the senate deliv-
ered on the 9th meeting held on 9th June 2011 on the Proposal for a
Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
(CCCTB), available at: <http:// www .senat .cz/ xqw/ xervlet/ pssenat/
htmlhled?action=doc&value=60520> (last visited 10 November 2013).
67. Ibid., at 2.
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parliament reluctance to tax integration, which is reflec-
ted in the recitals to the CCCTB Directive. It has been
very careful in pointing out that the CCCTB was not
designed to ‘interfere with financial accounts’, that har-
monisation would ‘not extend to the rates’ of taxation
and that it is ‘not intended to influence the tax revenues’
of Member States.68
Next to the lack of a specific legal base, in essence, the
parliamentary reaction to the CCCTB also shows a
political unwillingness of all 28 Member States to fur-
ther integrate their tax policies, while others might want
to. Some Member States have in fact been very favoura-
ble towards the Commission proposal, including the
Belgian House of Representatives69 and the Czech Sen-
ate.70 The latter, very much in Commission line, stated
that
finding a common European approach towards the
calculation of corporate tax base, that would arise
from expert debate on best practices in the area of
corporate taxation in individual Member States,
could lead to facilitation of cross-border business
activities and contribute to the strengthening of the
single market of the EU,71
and considered that it is
therefore, appropriate to focus, besides the CCCTB,
also on finding an optimal and effective European
framework for calculation of a common corporate tax
base without the aspects of consolidation and option-
ality.72
How should these discrepancies between Member
States be reconciled? Unanimity, under current circum-
stances, is unlikely to be reached, and subsidiarity issues
will continue to concern some parliaments. This is not
only the case of first efforts to integrate tax policies, but
would also effect all future changes to any system that is
put in place. Especially with regard to taxation, some
degree of legislative flexibility is needed.73 In the follow-
ing, therefore, possible solutions to the lack of unanimi-
ty will be assessed.
68. Explanatory memorandum to: Proposal for a Council Directive on a
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011)
121/4, para. 1, Context of the Proposal.
69. Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, Voorstel voor een richt-
lijn van de Raad 26 mei 2011 namens de commissie voor de financiën
en de begroting, uitgebracht door mevrouw Christiane, verslag betref-
fende een gemeenschappelijke geconsolideerde heffingsgrondslag voor
de vennootschapsbelasting (CCCTB) Subsidiariteitsadvies, DOC 53
1507/001, available at: <http:// www .ipex .eu/ IPEXL -WEB/ scrutiny/
COM20110121/bechb.do> (last visited 10 November 2013), at 25.
70. The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, 8th term, 241st
resolution of the senate delivered at the 9th meeting held on 9 June
2011 on the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidat-
ed Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), available at: <http://www.senat .cz/
xqw/xervlet/pssenat/htmlhled?action=doc&value=60520> (last visited
10 November 2013).
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. De Graaf, at 106-110.
4 How to Achieve Further Tax
Integration
4.1 Treaty Change
The most obvious solution to targeting the problems of
the legal base and subsidiarity is a Treaty change that
would create a more specific legal base for tax harmoni-
sation in the EU. With the introduction of a specific
legal base that would allow the EU to take action under
the ordinary legislative procedure, only a QMV in the
Council would be necessary to adopt legislation in the
field of taxation. In addition, depending on which kind
of competence would be attributed to the EU, exclusive
or shared,74 the subsidiarity issue would be either obso-
lete (if exclusive) or not such a problem (if shared).
Even when competence was to be shared with the Mem-
ber States, a specific legal base would not only make it
easier for the Commission to justify its action, but rather
a mandate under the Treaties as tax harmonisation
would become one of the objectives in the Treaty.
However, achieving Treaty change75 in the current
political climate is not an easy task, as the negotiations
on Treaty change in the early stages of reform efforts
have shown.76 As creating a legal basis for EU action on
taxation would confer a new competence for the EU, the
Treaties could be amended only by the ordinary revi-
sion procedure laid down in Article 48 TEU.77 The
revision procedure involves a convention of national
parliaments, heads of states or governments, a majority
vote of the European Parliament, unanimity in the
Council as well as ratification of every Member State
according to their constitutional requirements.78 As
already discussed, these kinds of requirements are
unlikely to be fulfilled in all Member States. However,
one could argue that to anchor the reforms to the EMU,
a considerable revision of the Treaties is necessary at
some point, as there has been lots of discussion on the
legality of some of the reforms.79 When this turning
point in European integration is reached, it will be time
to put taxation on the agenda and provide a basis for
harmonisation in the Treaties. At the same time, such a
Treaty change is, after the last failure of Treaty amend-
ment rounds, currently not to be envisaged. There are,
however, other (interim) solutions for further tax inte-
gration in the EU, some of which have already been
realised.
74. Arts. 3-5 TFEU.
75. Art. 48 TEU.
76. ‘EU Summit: All But Two Leaders Sign Fiscal Treaty’, BBC News,
2 March 2012, available at: <http:// www .bbc .co .uk/ news/ world -
europe-17230760> (last visited 10 November 2013).
77. As opposed to the simplified revision procedure, see Art. 48(2-5) for the
ordinary revision procedure and Art. 48(6-7) TEU for the simplified revi-
sion procedure.
78. Art. 48 TEU.
79. Including the German Constitutional Court’s judgments on, for exam-
ple, the European Financial Stability Mechanism, which concerned, inter
alia, parliamentary involvement. BVerfG, 2 BvE 8/11 vom 28.2.2012,
Absatz-Nr. (1-162), <http:// www .bverfg .de/ entscheidungen/
es20120228_2bve000811.html> (last visited 10 November 2013).
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4.2 Enhanced Cooperation
According to Article 20 TEU, Member states ‘which
wish to establish enhanced cooperation between them-
selves within the framework of the Union’s non-exclu-
sive competences’ are allowed to do so.80 They are then
allowed to make use of its institutions if the enhanced
cooperation aims to achieve one of the objectives of the
Union,81 but only if it can be established that there are
no other options to achieve the aim as the Union as a
whole.82 With regard to further corporate tax harmoni-
sation beyond the CCCTB, all three of these require-
ments are fulfilled. The objective to be achieved of any
tax-related enhanced cooperation, as has already been
discussed above, would be the proper functioning of the
Internal Market, which is a non-exclusive competence
of the Union.83 In addition, it has become clear that a
solution for the whole of the EU is unlikely to be a-
chieved in the short-term.
Therefore, enhanced cooperation could be an option for
further corporate tax integration. In fact, the Committee
for Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the
European Parliament has explicitly stated with regard to
the CCCTB that if the unanimous Council adoption of
the Directive fails, it would be appropriate to initiate
‘without delay’ the procedure for a Council decision
authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the
CCCTB. It emphasised that such enhanced cooperation
should be initiated by the Member States whose curren-
cy is the euro.84 It thereby indicates that it also sees the
strong connection between the EMU and stronger coor-
dination of company taxation. The likelihood of appro-
val for enhanced cooperation has also recently been
strengthened by the enhanced cooperation with regard
to the financial transaction tax between 11 Member
States.85
4.3 Soft Law
In addition to the hard law approaches of Treaty change
or enhanced cooperation, stronger tax coordination
could be achieved on the basis of a soft law approach.
This has, so far, also been an option of choice; the
Council Conclusions of December 1st, 1997 concerning
taxation policy, which formulate a Code of Conduct, are
an example of such successful coordination.86 This
Code of Conduct is obviously a non-binding instrument
80. Art. 20 TEU.
81. Art. 20(1) TEU.
82. Art. 20(2) TEU.
83. Art. 4(2)(a)TFEU.
84. 2011/0058(CNS) – 29/03/2012 Committee report tabled for plenary,
1st reading/single Reading, as well as summary available at: <http://
www .europarl .europa .eu/ sides/ getDoc .do ?type= REPORT& mode=
XML&reference=A7-2012-80&language=EN> (last visited 10 Novem-
ber 2013) at 1 of executive summary.
85. Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in
the area of financial transaction tax, COM(2013) 71 final, available at:
<http:// ec .europa .eu/ taxation_ customs/ resources/ documents/
taxation/com_2013_71_en.pdf> (last visited 10 November 2013).
86. 98/C 2/1Council Conclusions of 1 December 1997 concerning taxation
policy.
that, on the other hand, has strong political force.87 In
this Code of Conduct, Member States committed them-
selves to, first, abolish any tax measures that constitute
harmful tax competition88 based on the definition in the
Code itself,89 and, second, to refrain from introducing
any new measures that qualify as harmful tax competi-
tion.90 The Code has been substantivised by the estab-
lishment of the Code of Conduct group of EU Finance
Ministers under the leadership of the UK Paymaster.91
In 1999, this group issued a report that identified 66 tax
measures considered harmful.92
In addition to this Code of Conduct, the Commission
has also issued a communication advocating more trans-
parency in the area of tax policy,93 and also outlines the
success of the Code of Conduct, which has led to the
abolishment of more than 100 tax measures that fall
under the definition of harmful tax competition.94 Sure-
ly, the cooperation between Member States and the EU
institution has some more potential for integrating com-
pany tax in the future – the Open Method of Coordina-
tion, while setting common guidelines for Member
States, still allows for a lot of leeway for Member States
to harmonise their taxation policies in a non-intrusive
manner towards their own taxation system.
4.4 Indirect Harmonisation through EMU
Reform Legislation
While the approaches discussed above directly target the
harmonisation of taxation policies as such, there might
be other options to harmonise them a bit more indirectly
by means of the reformed system of economic govern-
ance in the EU. The six-pack and two-pack legislative
packages introduce an array of new powers for the Euro-
pean Commission with regard to budgetary oversight.
Regulation 473/201395 grants the Commission the right
to review national budgetary plans subject to a strict
timeline for the parliaments.96 Requirements for the
budgetary plans include the forecast of any government
expenditure and revenue,97 which are then assessed by
the Commission itself.98 The Commission then adopts
87. <http:// ec .europa .eu/ taxation_ customs/ taxation/ company_ tax/
harmful_tax_practices/> (last visited on 10 November 2013.
88. Council Conclusions of 1 December 1997 concerning taxation policy,
98/C 2/1, under D.
89. Ibid., under B.
90. Ibid., under C.
91. <http:// ec .europa .eu/ taxation_ customs/ taxation/ company_ tax/
harmful_tax_practices/> (last visited on 10 November 2013).
92. Annex A to the Report from the Code of Conduct Group (Business Tax-
ation) to the ECOFIN Council on 29 November 1999, available at:
<http:// ec .europa .eu/ taxation_ customs/ resources/ documents/
primarolo_en.pdf> (last visited on 10 November 10 2013).
93. COM(2009) 201 final, Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and
Social Committee ‘Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters’, Brus-
sels, 28 April 2009.
94. Ibid., para. 2.1.
95. Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and
assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive
deficit of the Member States in the euro area, OJ L 140/11.
96. Art. 6 Reg. 473/2013.
97. Art. 6(3) (b), (c), (d) Reg. 473/2013.
98. Art. 7 Reg. 473/2013.
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an opinion and can, under circumstances, request a
revised budgetary plan from the national parliament.99
Here, the Commission could, through the backdoor, try
to harmonise taxation policies of the Member States. In
combination with the country-specific recommenda-
tions in the European Semester, the Commission is
granted a profound insight into the fiscal situation of the
Member State concerned. Recommendations could
involve an assessment of the tax revenue estimate that a
Member State submits. Thereby, it could recommend
to what extent the company tax should be raised (or
lowered) so as to achieve the budgetary and economic
objectives.
The macroeconomic imbalances procedure100 offers
similar ways to influence a Member State’s taxation pol-
icy, since the Commission is granted the right to ‘in-
depth’ review a Member State’s economic and fiscal sit-
uation in case that it detects excessive macroeconomic
imbalances.101 However, on the one hand, one has to
keep in mind that both the two-pack and the six-pack
only apply to the euro area Member States. Therefore,
the scope of the Commission is somewhat limited in this
respect. On the other hand, as has been outlined above,
harmonisation of taxation policies is most beneficial for
those Member States that are part of the common cur-
rency as it stabilises the economy of the EMU.
The system of the new economic governance in the EU
might be a good way for the Commission to subtly har-
monise tax policies in the Internal Market/euro area.
However, the legitimacy of any such use of the six-pack
and two-pack could of course be questioned, not only by
scholarly debate, but also in front of the CJEU on the
basis of ultra vires action of the EU.
4.5 Non-EU Legislation
In light of the recent developments in EU constitutional
law, another option for harmonisation of taxation poli-
cies and laws needs to be considered here: the recourse
to intergovernmental treaties. Apart from traditional
bilateral and multilateral efforts and or treaties in the
field of taxation,102 the Member States of the EU have
started to draw up semi-EU law treaties that make use
of the EU institutions, but are, strictly speaking, not EU
law itself. Recourse to these treaties has been taken
exactly because unanimity in the ordinary Treaty
amendment procedures could not be reached.103 The
legality of this practice has been questioned in Prin-
99. Art. 7(2) Reg. 473/2013.
100. Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of
macroeconomic imbalances, OJ L 306/25 (hereinafter: Reg.
1176/2011).
101. Art. 5 Reg. 1176/2011.
102. See for example the Franco-German paper on business taxation: Bun-
desministerium der Finanzen en Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances
et de l’Industrie, ‘Grünbuch der Deutsch-Französischen Zusammenar-
beit über Konvergenzpunkte bei der Unternehmensbesteuerung’,
6 February 2012.
103. ‘EU Suffers Worst Split in History as David Cameron Blocks Treaty
Change’, see above, n. 49.
gle,104 who argued that, first, the amendment of Article
136 TFEU constituted an unlawful amendment of the
TFEU and, secondly, that by ratifying, approving or
accepting the ESM treaty, Ireland had undertaken obli-
gations incompatible with the Treaties,105 that is, that
the establishment of the ESM did not fall under Mem-
ber State competence.
However, the Court confirmed the validity of the ESM
Treaty, making a clear distinction between economic
(coordination) and monetary (exclusive competence of
the Union) policies and concluded that Articles 4(3), 13
TEU, and Articles 2(3), 3(1)(c)TFEU ‘do not preclude
the conclusion between the Member States whose cur-
rency is the euro of an agreement such as the European
Stability Mechanism or ratification of that Treaty’106
(emphasis added by the author).
It might be the case that the Court very consciously
chose to include the words ‘such as’ in its judgment to
create room for future intergovernmental treaties that
make de facto EU law, where no competences are
directly transferred to the EU. Taxation competences
are not transferred to the EU either: Therefore, inter-
governmental treaties such as the ESM treaty (meaning
between a large majority of Member States) in the field
of, say, taxation are seemingly ‘legalised’ by the Court.
At least, the Court does not set limits for Member
States in that respect.
However, one has to take into account what consequen-
ces this intergovernmental approach would have for the
EU. Intergovernmental treaties, such as the ESM Trea-
ty or a possible taxation treaty, avoid not only the una-
nimity trap, but also any deep debate in the EU as a
whole. If recourse to intergovernmental treaties
becomes a normal Union method, Member States might
not even try to reach unanimity anymore. All the other
options considered above are generally seen as a last
resort and have at their outset the striving for unanimity
in the Union as a whole.
5 Conclusion and General
Concerns
In the foregoing, the question was raised as to how to
overcome the current legal obstacles to tax company
integration. In times of economic crisis, it has become
clear that the main problem and obstacle to be overcome
is the unanimity requirement that Article 115 TFEU
poses. To overcome this, this article assessed a Treaty
change, the possibility of enhanced cooperation, soft law
approaches and also indirect harmonisation by means of
the new system of economic governance in the EU, as
104. Pringle judgment of the Court (Full Court) of 27 November 2012, Tho-
mas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney Gener-
al, C-370/12, not yet reported.
105. C-370/12 – Pringle, para. 1.
106. C-370/12 – Pringle para. 186(2).
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well as a non-EU law solution of an intergovernmental
treaty.
It has to be concluded that a Treaty change might be on
the future agenda of European leaders; currently, the
constitutional requirements under Article 48 TFEU will
not be met soon. Recourse to an intergovernmental trea-
ty such as the ESM Treaty might be an easy and fast
solution; however, ‘traditional’ EU law approaches have
to be favoured. This is because of the fact that at least
enhanced cooperation, soft law approaches and indirect
harmonisation have as their ambition to reach consen-
sus, if not unanimity, between Member States. Forcing
economic integration, in particular fiscal integration, on
Member States may do more harm than good for the
future of the EMU. Some of the approaches discussed
better allow Member States to implement taxation har-
monisation at their own pace and in accordance with
their political debate over time, rather than creating a
premature break-up by means of yet another treaty next
to the EU framework. In addition, these mechanisms
have the considerable advantage that they are already
put in place and are partly used. However, for the pur-
pose of overall economic cohesion in the EU, a solution
in which all Member participate remains the most desir-
able, in order to avoid further fragmentation of the
EMU framework. Now it remains a question of not only
time, but also effort until Treaty revision is realised.
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